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I.

ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN REPLY TO
IDHW'S BRIEF PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 35(c)
While, of course, maintaining all arguments and authorities presented in her

opening brief, AppellantlPlaintiff, Lynette Patterson ("Patterson") asserts the following
additional positions in support of her appeal in this matter and in reply to the responsive
brief filed by RespondentlDefendant, Idaho Department of Health & Welfare ("IDHW").
Of particular note, relative to her appellate positions regarding her claim under the Idaho
Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), I.C. §67-5901, et seq., Patterson replies to IDHW's
arguments by distinguishing the two, separate, anti-retaliation protections she enjoys
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (generally "Title VII"), 42 U.S.c. §2000e-5, et
seq.

Under the protection afforded her by the participation clause, the objective

reasonableness of Patterson's complaints of illegal conduct is not material. Under this
analysis, the summary judgment entered on IHRA's claims should be set aside.
Further, under the opposition clause, ample and genuine issues of material fact
exist regarding the objective reasonableness of Patterson's complaints of illegal,
workplace conduct, and the existence of these factual issues mandates a reversal of the
summary judgment entered on Patterson's IHRA claim. On this last point, this reply
brief also provides additional, significant authority which supports the proposition that
Patterson's complaints about the workplace conduct being illegal were objectively
reasonable.
Finally with respect to her IHRA claim and though IDHW did not file a notice of
cross-appeal on this point, IDHW asserts in its appellate brief that the District Court erred
in finding that Patterson had been subjected to an adverse employment action. In this
reply brief, Patterson will set forth the factual and legal bases that supported that ruling.
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By laying out such bases, this Court will recognize that the District Court's ruling was
appropriate, as genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude the entry of summary
judgment on this point.
Relative to her claim under the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act
("IPPEA"), I.C. §6-21 01, et seq., Patterson herein provides additional authority and
fleshes out further her argument that IDHW waived its affirmative defense of statute of
limitations by failing to plead it.

A.

This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Dismissal of
Patterson's IHRA Claim.

As is well-settled, pursuant to O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 811, 810 P.2d
1082, 1097 (1991), Idaho courts are to look to the growing body of federal case law in
interpreting the parameters of the IHRA. In turn, most of the authority relied upon by
Patterson in arguing her IHRA claim has been issued by federal courts.

1. The dismissal of Patterson's IHRA claim was improper, as she can
establish the prima facie case for Title VII retaliation under the
participation clause.
An employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee for opposing an
unlawful employment practice or making a charge in an employment discrimination
investigation or proceeding. Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1558-59 (9th
Cir.1994); Davenport v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Center of Community College
District, 654 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1086-1087 (E.D.Cai. 2009).

In the case sub judice,

Patterson was participating in an employment discrimination investigation, when she
voiced her complaints about the affair and preferential treatment to her employer's, a
public agency's, human resources personnel and civil rights investigators.
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The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or
joint
labor-management
committee
controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including onthe-job training programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership,
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
As the Ninth Circuit has held:
An employer can violate the anti-retaliation provisions
of Title VII in either of two ways: "(1) if the (adverse
employment action] occurs because of the employee's
opposition to conduct made an unlawful employment
practice by the subchapter, or (2) if it is in retaliation
for the employee's participation in the machinery set up
by Title VII to enforce its provisions." Silver v. KCA,
Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir.1978) (interpreting 42
U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a) (§ 704(a))). "The considerations
controlling the interpretation of the opposition clause are
not entirely the same as those applying to the participation
clause. The purpose of the latter is to protect the employee
who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his
rights." Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692,
695 (9th Cir.1978). The district court appears to have
examined Hashimoto's retaliation claim under the
opposition clause only. Under the participation clause,
however, there can be little doubt that Hashimoto's visit
with the EEO counselor constituted participation "in
the machinery set up by Title VII." As such, it was
protected activity. See, e.g., Eastland v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 627 (lIth Cir.1983) (contacting an
EEO officer is protected activity); Gonzalez v. Bolger, 486
F.Supp. 595, 601 (D.D.C.1980) ("Once plaintiff ... initiates
pre-complaint contact with an EEO counselor ... he is
participating in a Title VII proceeding." (citations
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT -- 3

omitted)), afj'd, 656 F.2d 899 (D.C.Cir.1981). Thus, we
conclude that the district court erred in determining that
Hashimoto failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation.
Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (emphasis added); see also Whitley v. City of
Portland, 654 F .Supp.2d 1194, 1213 (D.Or. 2009).

In the case at bar, Patterson is

protected by the participation clause within Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.
When Patterson complained to IDHW's human resources professionals and civil
rights investigators, Bethany Zimmerman, Monica Young, and Heidi Graham, she was
participating in the "machinery set up by Title VII." IDHW is obviously, as a state
agency, a governmental actor. IDHW's employees are clearly acting on behalf of the
state government, when they act within the course and scope of their employments.
When Patterson complained to IDHW personnel within its human resources department,
she was complaining to persons who were, in part, some of the machinery set up by Title
VII and to police workplaces under that statute.
Patterson complained on numerous occasions to these state actors about the illicit,
intra-office romantic affair that was occurring between her supervisor and a coworker;
she also complained about the preferential treatment which was occurring in the
workplace as a result of that affair.

R, Vol. III, p. 596; R, Vol. IV, pp. 626-627.

Plaintiff's own, credible affidavit testimony also sets forth the civil rights nature of her
complaints regarding the affair and the preferential treatment as well as IDHW's own
recognition that that Patterson was engaging in a civil rights/Title VII investigation. R,
Vol. IV, pp. 777-778. As such, she is protected by the participation clause within Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision.
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When protected by the participation clause, a plaintiff-employee is not required to
demonstrate that her complaints were either expressing actual violations of law or were
objectively-reasonable, if not actual violations of law. Under the participation clause,
even a visit with an EEO counselor, similar to IDHW's human resources/civil rights
investigators (i.e. Zimmerman, Graham, and Young), constituted participation "in the
machinery set up by Title VII." See, e.g., E.E. 0. C. v. California Psychiatric Transitions,
Inc., 2010 WL 2754358, *5 (E.D.Cal. 2010) (citing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671,

680 (9th Cir. 1997)).
The participation clause includes those whom the employer has reason to believe
is assisting the employee in protected activity. Id. (citing Wilken v. Cascadia Behavioral
Health Care, Inc., 2007 WL 2916482, *27 (D.Or. 2007)).

IDHW, by employing

Zimmerman, Graham, and Young in their positions, certainly had reason to believe that
these individuals were assisting Patterson in protected activity (i.e. complaints of
preferential treatment and pay as a result of an intra-office, romantic affair).
Given the intentionally broad ambit of the participation clause, Patterson was
certainly engaged in a protected activity, when she complained to IDHW personnel about
the affair and its attendant preferential treatment.

Once engaged in that protected

activity, Patterson could not be retaliated against.

It is of no import that paramour

favoritism does not violate Title VII; that analysis is only necessary under the opposition
clause of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-3(a). By contrast, under the participation clause of that
statute, the employee-plaintiff s accuracy in reporting workplace conduct as illegal, as
well as her good faith and reasonable belief in that illegality, are immaterial to theanalysis. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F .3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997); Booker v. Brown &
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Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F .2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Holway, 439
F.Supp.2d 180,222 (D.D.C. 2006). In tum, whether paramour favoritism is illegal under
Title VII and. whether an objectively-reasonable person would consider it such are of no
concern in gauging this case under the participation clause. Id
In the case sub judice, while the reasonableness of Patterson's beliefs about the
illegality of the affair and its resultant preferential treatment are considerations for the
discussion, infra, regarding the opposition clause, it is not germane in the present discuss
of the participation clause. When Patterson complained about perceived illegal conduct
to the human resources/civil rights investigators within her state agency, she
automatically was protected by the participation clause. As such, she was engaged in a
protected activity.
Being engaged in a "protected activity" is the first element of the prima facie case
for retaliation under Title VII. See, e.g., Surrell v. California Water Servo Co., 518 F.3d
1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th
Cir. 1983). When an employee protests the actions of a supervisor as being violative of
Title VII, such opposition is a protected activity for analysis of a retaliation claim under
Title VII. See, e.g.,

E.E.o.c.

v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir.

2009); Trent v. Valley Electric Ass'n, Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994). Even
informal complaints constitute protected activity. Noga v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 583
F.Supp.2d 1245, 1262 (D.Or. 2008) (citing Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer

Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000); Knox v. City of Portland, 543 F.Supp.2d
. 1238, 1248 (D.Or. 2008).

Under these plaintiff-friendly standards, which encourage

employees to come forward about workplace misbehavior rather than chilling such
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efforts, Patterson has demonstrated that her complaints about the affair and preferential
treatment are "protected activity."
By being engaged in a protected activity under Title VII due .to her participation
in the agency's investigations and discussing the affair and preferential treatment with
Zimmerman, Graham, and Young, it was error for the District Court to grant summary
judgment on Patterson's IHRA claim. Patterson's IHRA claim should be reinstated and
remanded to the trial court.
2. The dismissal of Patterson's IHRA claim was improper, as she can
establish the prima Jacie case for Title VII retaliation under the
opposition clause, as her complaints and beliefs were objectively
reasonable.

Throughout this litigation, much ink has been spilled relative to whether paramour
favoritism is illegal under Title VII.

Patterson recognizes that the clear weight of

authority is that paramour favoritism is not illegal under Title VII. However, that is not
the critical enquiry. If Patterson can demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that she
held a good faith, reasonable belief that paramour favoritism could be illegal, then the
District Court's grant of summary judgment on her IHRA claim must be reversed.
In a Title VII-retaliation case, the complained-of conduct need not actually be
illegal, but the employee must prove that a reasonable person might have believed that it
was true. Osher v. Univ. of Maine System, 703 F.Supp.2d 51, 66 (D.Me. 2010) (citing
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1999)). Whether

a plaintiffs belief was 'objectively reasonable,' and not merely subjective, is determined
based on the facts and the record presented. Martin v. State University of New York, 704
F.Supp.2d 202,228 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Thomas v. Westchester County Health Care
Corp., 232 F.Supp.2d 273,279 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Objectiveness, as it is measured in this
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context (i.e. Title VII-retaliation cases), must make due allowance for the limited
knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of
their claims. Mayo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994). This last point should
resonate, as it recognizes the societal reality that most American employees are not
familiar with the intricacies of Title VII law.
The standard used is that of a "reasonable person," not a "reasonable lawyer" or a
"reasonable paralegal."

Patterson's knowledge of the substantive law relative to

violations of Title VII is not dispositive of this aspect of the instant appeal. There is
evidence in the record from which a jury could properly determine that Patterson's
beliefs about illegal, workplace conduct were objectively reasonable. The most notable
evidence comes from her own interactions with and directives from her former employer,
IDHW.
First, IDHW's own human resources/civil rights personnel and investigators (i.e.
Young, Zimmerman, and Graham) specifically advised Patterson that they were looking
into "Title VII" violations relative to the intra-office affair and potential, preferential
treatment that were occurring and that Patterson could seek further redress, if she was
dissatisfied with the outcomes of these investigations. R., Vol. IV, pp. 777-779. Under
these facts and circumstances, most every reasonable employee, if her employer is a
reliable one (as one hopes a state agency is), would believe that the paramour favoritism
that was occurring was illegal. Patterson is no different than any other such employee.
Herein is genuine evidence that Patterson's beliefs were objectively reasonable.
Second, IDHW specifically trained Patterson, in personnel trainings and
workshops, that paramour favoritism was illegal and created a hostile work environment.
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R., Vol. IV, pp. 776-777 and 782-792. Again, if one's employer is a reliable one, it is
reasonable for an employee to trust that the employment trainings being afforded her are
accurate statements. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-11.
Most notably, IDHW's arguments that the foregoing facts should basically be
disregarded seem to forget that Patterson, at the summary judgment stage of the
proceedings, is entitled to have every reasonable inference drawn in her favor as the nonmoving party. This certainly is the situation, where IDHW argues that Patterson's own
affidavit somehow shows she did not consider paramour favoritism to be illegal until a
late date (i.e. after she engaged in the protected activity). Respondent Idaho Department

of Health & Welfare's Response Briefat 18-19.
This position is unfounded and ignores significant evidence in the record,
including, not the least of which, specific paragraphs from that very affidavit. In the

Affidavit of Lynette Patterson in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's IHRA Claim (R., Vol. IV, p. 776
through R., Vol. V, p. 801), Patterson clearly spells out, in

~~4,5,6,

and 8, that she had

valid reasons to believe that the intra-office affair and preferential treatment were illegal
and creating a hostile work environment. These paragraphs also set forth that she held
these beliefs in the December 2004 through August 2005 time frame, which would be the
same period when she was engaging in the activities protected under Title VII. R., Vol.
IV, pp. 777-779. In tum, Patterson's own affidavit is not fatal as IDHW characterizes,
especially as Patterson is the one entitled to every reasonable inference from the
evidence, including- the reasonable inferences to be drawn from IDHW's own-training
materials on sexual harassment and hostile work environment.
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Apparently recogmzmg that its own training manuals indicate that paramour
favoritism may be illegal, IDHW argues that an employer's own training manuals cannot
provide a plaintiff with a reasonable basis to believe that she is engaging in protected
activity. In doing so, IDHW relies upon Sherk v. Adea Atlanta, L.L.c., 432 F.Supp.2d
1358 (N.D. Ga. 2006). This case is distinguishable.
In Sherk, the employer's ethics handbook simply adopted a more restrictive policy
regarding paramour favoritism than governing law in the Eleventh Circuit provided.
Sherk, 432 F.Supp.2d at 1372. In the case at bar, IDHW also adopted a more restrictive
policy on paramour favoritism and romantic relationships in the workplace. R, Vol. III,
pp. 558-561. However, and more importantly, IDHW went much farther than did the
employer in Sherk. IDHW went well beyond simply adopting a restrictive policy on
romantic relationships in the workplace.
IDHW actually trained its employees, including Patterson, that, "A sexually
hostile work environment can be created by. . .granting job favors to those who
participate in consensual sexual activity." R., Vol. IV, pp. 776-777 and 783. IDHW
should not be allowed to run from this fact.

It trained Patterson to believe that the

preferential treatment which Stiles and the SUR Unit were receiving, as a result of the
Warren/Stiles affair and at the expense of Patterson and the Fraud Unit, could well be
considered a "sexually hostile work environment." Frankly, there is probably no better
evidence that a Title VII-retaliation plaintiff could proffer to show her objective
reasonableness in believing that paramour favoritism was illegal.
In a further, strained argument asserting that Patterson's beliefs were not
objectively reasonable, IDHW contends that issues of reasonableness can be decided as a
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matter of law. Respondent Idaho Department of Health & Welfare's Response Brief at
15-18. While Plaintiff recognizes that such may rarely be the case, it certainly is not the
-more common and generally-recognized rule of law in Idaho. See, e.g., Davis v. Parrish,
131 Idaho 595, 597, 961 P.2d 1198, 1200 (1998); Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86, 88, 794
P.2d 1142, 1144 (1990); Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 122, 126,
898 P.2d 53 (1995); Reynolds v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 362, 365,
766 P.2d 1243, 1246 (1988). Moreover, in the face of above-noted evidence creating
genuine issues of material fact relative to Patterson's objective reasonableness, this issue
cannot be decided as a matter of law.
IDHW cites Reece v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 1817787 (D.Idaho
2010), for the proposition that reasonableness can be decided as a matter of law. Much
like Sherk, the Reece case is materially and dispositively distinguishable from the case at
bar. In Reece, no reasonable person could conclude that the plaintiff was engaged in
protected activity under Title VII, because the plaintiffs/school teacher's complaints
were about the sexual harassment of students, not coworkers. Reece, 2010 WL 1817787,
*9. Title VII does not seek to regulate or manage teacher/student relationships, only
employer/employee relationships. The very language of the statute itself only proscribes
discrimination against an individual, " ... [W]ith respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. §2000-3(a) (emphasis added).
Interestingly, Judge Winmill in Reece specifically relied upon the same instructional
ruling from Mayo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994) ("" ... [T]he Ninth Circuit
held that the reasonableness of a plaintiffs belief that an unlawful employment practice
occurred must be assessed according to an objective standard, 'one that makes due
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allowance, moreover, for the limited knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs
about the factual and legal bases of their claims."), upon which Patterson bases part of
her own reasonableness argument, supra.
IDHW also cites Moberly v. Midcontinent Communication, 2010 WL 1856454
(D.S.D. 2010), for the proposition that a Title VII -retaliation plaintiff's reasonableness
can be decided as a matter of law. Again, as with Shrek and Reece, IDHW's reliance on

Moberly is misplaced.
In Moberly, the court found that the plaintiffs beliefs were neither subjectively
nor objectively reasonable. Moberly, 2010 WL 1856454, *16. By contrast, in the case

sub judice, the District Court has specifically found, "The Court fully credits
[Patterson's] assertion throughout this litigation that she believed in good faith the
conduct she opposed was unlawful." R., Vol. V, p. 840. That finding in itself makes

Moberly materially inapposite to the case at bar. With the trial court already finding that
her beliefs were subjectively reasonable and held in good faith, the objective
reasonableness of Patterson's beliefs about improprieties in the workplace is that much
more of a jury question.
Patterson's reasonableness can only be decided as a matter of law, if no
reasonable person could believe that the affair and preferential treatment were violations
of Title VII. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S., 268, 269-271, 121
S.Ct. 1508, 1509-1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001).

Given Patterson's discussions with

IDHW's own human resources/civil rights personnel and investigators that Title VII
violations were being investigated, IDHW's specific training of her that paramour
favoritism could be illegal, and her complaint filed with the Idaho Human Rights
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Commission that identified and alleged a hostile work environment (R., Vol. III, pp. 563565), reasonable people could properly conclude that Patterson's belief that paramour
favoritism was illegal was held with objective reasonableness.
3. If this Court reviews the District Court's finding that Patterson
was subjected to an adverse employment action, it should not
disturb that finding, as genuine issues of material fact preclude the
entry of summary judgment on this point.
In the trial court proceedings, IDHW moved for summary judgment on the second
element of a retaliation claim (i.e. adverse employment action).

That aspect of its

summary judgment motion was denied. R., Vol. IV, p. 765. Without having filed any
notice of cross-appeal, IDHW nonetheless challenges in this appeal that ruling from the
District Court. While I.A.R. 35(b)(4) allows an appellee to raise additional issues on
appeal, if an appellant's issues on appeal are insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional
issues for review, nevertheless this Court should not even consider this argument. The
denial of a summary judgment is not an appealable order. Aardeman v.

us.

Dairy

Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789,215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009); Hunter v. Dep't a/Carr.,

138 Idaho 44, 46, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002); Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. Cazier, 127
Idaho 879, 884,908 P.2d 572, 577 (Ct.App. 1995); Ernst v. Hemenway and Moser Co.,
Inc., 126 Idaho 980, 895 P.2d 581 (Ct.App. 1995) (" ... [A]n order denying a motion for

summary judgment is nonappealable per se and not reviewable."); Keeler v. Keeler, 124
Idaho 407, 410, 860 P.2d 23, 26 (Ct.App. 1993).

That is precisely what IDHW is

appealing here - the denial of a portion of its summary judgment motion.
However, should this Court substantively entertain IDHW's argument on this
point in the face of clear precedent to the contrary, Patterson asserts the same arguments
she raised in the trial court.

These arguments resulted, of course, in a finding that
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genuine issues of material fact existed which resulted in the denial of summary judgment
on the "adverse employment action" element of the prima facie case for Title VII
retaliation. R., Vol. JV, p. 765. Patterson thus incorporates by reference herein her
arguments and authorities from the trial court on this point. See R., Vol. III, pp. 534-540

(Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment), R., Vol.
III, pp. 497-524 (Statement of Disputed Facts in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment), and R., Vol. III, p. 548 through Vol. IV, p. 729 (Affidavit of Jason
R.N Monteleone in Opposition to Defendant's Motionfor Summary Judgment).
In the trial court, Patterson clearly demonstrated that genuine issues of material
fact exist relative to the issue of whether IDHW, her former employer, subjected her to
any adverse employment actions.

As such, the District Court's ruling on this point

should not be disturbed.

B.

This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Dismissal of
Patterson's IPPEA Claim.

In her opening brief, Appellant previously outlined the factual issues that should
have prevented the entry of summary judgment on her IPPEA claim and will not repeat
them here.

With the waiver portion of her argument, Patterson is primarily simply

requesting this Court to apply the governing procedural rules, as they have been written.
The law in Idaho is clear, and has even been most recently announced by the
Idaho Court of Appeals, that the failure to plead an affirmative defense required under
I.R.C.P. 8(c) normally results in the waiver of that defense. Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho
187, 191, 191 P.3d 1107, 1101 (Ct.App. 2008) (citing Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 100,
15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000), Garren v. Butigan, 95 Idaho 355, 357-359, 509 P.2d 340, 342REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT -- 14

344 (1973), and Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 138,686 P.2d 79, 83 (Ct.App.
1984 )).

In facing the litany of Idaho cases that addresses the waiver of Rule 8(c)

affirmative defenses for failure to plead, IDHW relies on Fuhriman v. State of Idaho,
Dep't of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 153 P .3d 480 (2007), a case that does not even involve

an affirmative defense enumerated within I.R.C.P. 8(c).
Fuhriman involved the statutory employer rule, under I.C. §72-223, an

affirmative defense commonly-raised in hybrid tort actions in Idaho, where there is a
workers' compensation claim and a related, third-party personal injury action. Fuhriman,
143 Idaho at 803, 153 P.3d at 483. However, that rule of law is not one of the affirmative
defenses referenced in I.R.C.P. 8(c). In tum, Fuhriman does not drill down to the core
issue here.
I.R.C.P. 8(c), in clear, mandatory terms, states, "In pleading to a preceding
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... statute of limitations .... " I.R.C.P. 8(c)
(emphasis added). Idaho's courts, unlike the federal courts, require a defending party to
go even one step further and to specifically identify the precise statute that is providing
the limitations defense. I.R.C.P. 9(h). Despite these procedural requirements in Idaho, it
is uncontroverted that IDHW never affirmatively raised a limitations defense until the
summary judgment proceedings. It never pled statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense in either its answer or its amended answer. Thus, under Idaho law, supra, it has
waived that defense.
During the trial court proceedings of the instant appeal, the District Court
followed Fuhriman, though it recognized the statutory employer rule is not an 8(c)
defense, because it found that Fuhriman relied on Bluestone v. Matthewson, 103 Idaho
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453,649 P.2d 1209 (1982), which did involve an 8(c) defense, the statute of frauds. R.,
Vol. IV, p. 762. However, a full reading of Bluestone presents sound analysis supporting
the proposition that IDHW waived its limitations defense.
In Bluestone, the Idaho Supreme Court was reviewing a $390.00 dispute that had
originated in the Magistrate Court of Nez Perce County. Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 453,
649 P.2d at 1209. The affirmative defense at issue was the statute of frauds. Bluestone,
103 Idaho at 454, 649 P.2d at 1210. Procedurally, the magistrate judge applied the
statute of frauds defense, though it had not been pled, but the district judge found there
had been a waiver of the statute of frauds defense. Id. In Idaho, appeals from Magistrate
Court to District Court, in civil cases from a small claims department (e.g. $390.00) are
conducted de novo. I.R.C.P. 83(b). In tum, the district judge in Bluestone was not
obligated to follow the ruling that came out of the Magistrate Court. As the proceeding
began anew at the district court level, and the statute of frauds had been raised (though
not actually pled) at the magistrate court level, the parties were all fairly apprised at the
practical inception of the litigation (i.e. the de novo review at the district court level). In
tum, there was no substantial prejudice caused to any party in Bluestone by the failure to
plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense, as the proceedings began anew at the
district court level, but the statute of frauds defense had been considered at the magistrate
court level. Here, such is not the case, as Patterson will suffer severe prejudice, if her
IPPEA claim is dismissed with a limitations defense that was never pled by IDHW.
Basically, the cases relied upon by IDHW that find no waiver of the affirmative
defense are very procedurally distinct from the case at bar. Unlike those cases where the
initial, formal position taken by the defending party in a litigation was its summary
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judgment motion or otherwise occurred in situations where it was an appeal from a
magistrate decision, the instant case had a much different, procedural history during its
trial court proceedings.

IDHW, unlike_ the parties tardily asserting the affirmative

defenses in Fuhriman and Bluestone, answered the complaint, amended its answer once
by stipulation, never moved to amend its answer further in over two years of litigation,
yet still failed to properly plead statute of limitations, a defense which is specifically
listed in I.R.C.P. 8(c) and also is subject to the particularity and specificity requirements
ofI.R.C.P.9(h).
Where, as here, a party has had multiple opportunities to plead the affirmative
defense of statute of limitations, as procedurally required, that party must meet the
pleading mandates of I.R.C.P. 8(c) and 9(h).

Thus IDHW, by failing to raise its

limitations defense until the summary judgment stage of this litigation, waived that
defense. The trial court should therefore not have dismissed Patterson's IPPEA claim on
this basis.

II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, as well as those outlined in her
opening brief, Patterson respectfully requests this Court to reverse the entries of summary
judgment on both the IHRA and IPPEA claims and remand this case to the District Court
for adjudication through trial by jury.
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